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L Background and Summary
The legal rules which govern the allocation of interstate surface waters for
consumptive uses in the Western United States typically assume some sort of
diversion from the stream and the existence of scarcity. By custom, the legal
framework of allocation is referred to as the "Law of the River" - shorthand
for a catalog of principles that emerge from the legal and political history of
competition for the limited flows of the Colorado River. Through interstate
compacts, treaties, Congressional legislation, and litigation before the Supreme
Court, the Colorado has been carved-up among basins, tribes, states and the
major use constituencies, including hydropower, domestic water supply and
irrigation. The resulting legal forms and rules provide a template to be used
in resolving controversies in other western basins.'
The prerequisite to an interstate allocation is over-appropriation of the
available supply. Claimants include private water users - principally
irrigators, industry and municipalities - which have established claims under
state property law, usually in some form of the prior appropriation system.
These property interests are represented by their respective state governments
acting parenspatriae. Indian tribes and the United States as landowner also
assert claims, as do foreign nations. Finally, the United States as developer
and regulator of interstate streams may also assert claims pursuant to some
governing act of Congress, such as that which authorizes the construction of
a dam or irrigation project

*

Professor of Law, University of South Dakota.
1. See generally Charles J. Meyers, The ColoradoRiver, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).
2. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated and
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The process of legal allocation is complicated by the fact that most rivers
in the West flow through a number of states and tribal reservations as well as
federal land. These political boundaries ignore nature's hydrologic features,
thus creating "problems of government that are defined by natural rather than
political boundaries."3 In addition, there are always pressures to export water
from a basin to areas of greater need.
Where there are interstate, inter-region, inter-jurisdiction or international
water disputes, no one decision maker can establish all of the rules, but
interstate water law - the Law of the River - is the sum of the effort in the
American West. Contributions come from interstate compact, allocation by
Congress, or adjudication before the Supreme Court of the United States.
Interstate compacts are provided for by Article I of the United States
Constitution.4 Negotiation typically occurs among states, tribes and the United
States. The results of compact negotiation are ratified by state legislatures and
the Congress. An interstate stream compact serves as a permanent allocation
of water among the states involved, subject only to the power of Congress to
modify or revoke its approval of the compact The Supreme Court regularly
emphasizes that compact negotiation is superior to litigation.6
Once a state has ratified a compact, it is binding upon the state and its
citizens, and cannot be unilaterally nullified.7 The original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court may be invoked by a State to enforce a compact obligation,
or to interpret compact language
A second method of stream allocation is available by direct action of the
federal Congress. The federal government has extensive powers over
interstate waters, navigable waters, and nonnavigable tributaries of navigable
waters.! As a result Congress is able to deal extensively with the question of
water allocation among the states, tribes and regions. There are some
advantages to this approach. Congress can act with dispatch when compared
to the nearly endless duration of complex litigation. Congress can fashion a
comprehensive solution, whereas a Court is limited by the controversy
presented to it. Congress, through its hearing procedure can weigh all
viewpoints, and develop an equitable solution. In addition Congress can
mitigate the more disagreeable effects of a proposed solution by appropriating

Restated, 56 U. CoLo. L. REv. 381 (1985).
3. State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 24 (1951).
3.
4. U. S. CONST. art. , § 10, cl.
5. William A. Garton, South Dakota'sSystem of Water Managementand Its Relation to Land
Use and Economic Development, 21 S.D. L. REv. 1, 63 (1976).
6. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943).
7. Dyer, 341 U.S. at 28.
8. Id.
9. See Eva H. Morreale, FederalPower in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and The
Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RES. J. 1 (1963).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol24/iss1/13

No. 1]

INDIAN WATER RIGHTS

funds for water use efforts such as development projects. Of course, Congress
can bring to bear a concern for the larger national interest.
A third method of allocation is by litigation before the Supreme Court of
the United States pursuant to its original jurisdiction.'" In litigation of this
type, one state, representing the interests of it citizen water users parens
patriae brings an original action before the Supreme Court of the United
States against another state or states." For such an action to be brought there
must be an actual controversy over the use of water from an interstate stream,
and this exists when the waters of an interstate stream are in fact overappropriated, although an actual water shortage need not exist.'2
No precise doctrine has emerged that the Court will rely upon in resolving
cases of this type, although the name given to the resulting doctrine equitable apportionment - provides a reasonably apt description. The Court
decides these on a case-by-case basis, reaching an "exercise of an informed
judgment on a consideration of many factors."'3 As the Court stated in an
early decision:
Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical
and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the
several sections of the river, the character and rate of return
flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage
water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on down-stream areas,
the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to
downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former these are all relevant factors. They are merely an illustrative, not
an exhaustive catalog. They indicate the nature of the problem of
apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which must
be made. 4
It is against this background that the Law of the River emerged in the form
of the 1960 Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. California. That case
grew out of a complex history and is only summarized here. 6 In it, all three
legal devices for interstate allocation are involved.
The case began with the 1922 Colorado River Compact which was
negotiated in an attempt to resolve competing claims to the interstate flows
of the Colorado. It apportioned the river waters on an essentially equal basis
between the upper and lower basins. The Compact made it possible for the

10.
II.
12.
13.
14.

U. S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cls. I, 2.
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1906).
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
Id. at 618.
lt

15. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
16. Meyers, supra note 1.
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lower basin states to use water needed for its growing population, and to
undertake major water project engineering. The upper basin states saw the
Compact as the means by which they would prevent Colorado River water
from being monopolized by the faster-growing lower basin states through the
establishment of legal and equitable priorities of appropriation. The compact
did not, however, divide the water among the states themselves; that question
remained open. 7
In 1929 Congress enacted the Boulder Canyon Project Act" which among
other things authorized construction of the Hoover Dam. The practical effect
of this lam and associated facilities was that California was to be able to
increase substantially its diversions from the river in order to fuel the
phenomenal economic and population growth that was then occurring in the
southern part of that state. The growth of Arizona remained in the future, and
it felt threatened by the California diversions. As a result, it filed an original
suit in the Supreme Court, asking for a judicial determination of its water
rights.' The United States intervened, and a full apportionment of the stream
was underway. More than five years later, a decision was handed down by
the high court. Arizona had asked the Court to allocate the waters judicially,
following the doctrine of equitable apportionment. The Court declined to do
so, holding instead that Congress had effected an allocation of the lower basin
water in the Boulder Canyon Project Act. On this basis the Court came up
with a specific quantitative allocation.'
An enduring sub-theme in the decision of Arizona v. California is that of
Indian water rights. The Court recognized rights of Indian tribes living within
the Colorado River basin to water necessary to achieve the purpose of the five
reservations located along the main stem of the river in the lower basin.' In
addition to recognizing the prior water rights of those tribes, it adopted a
standard of "practicably irrigable acreage" as the measure of the tribes water
right. The dates of the establishment of the reservations was recognized as the
priority date of the rights, which were to be carved-out of the individual
apportionment for each state in which a reservation is located.'
Indian water rights thus emerge with vigor from the Colorado River
litigation, although they trace their roots to the famous decision in Winters v.
United States,' in which the Supreme Court held that the act of reserving
land for specific tribes in Montana had not only set aside lands, but also
17. See David H. Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 413 (1985).

18. Pub. L. No. 642, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928).
19.
20.
WATER
21.
22.
23.

Meyers, supra, note 1, at 39-43, 51-53.
Lawrence J. MacDonnell & David H. Getches, ColoradoRiver Basin, in 6 WATERS AND
Rors 5, 18-19 (Robert E. Beck ed., 2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1994).
ld. at 24-25.
l
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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impliedly reserved a sufficient quantity of water to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation - to make the reservation useful. In addition, the Court held that
the implied Indian water right was superior to state-created (prior
appropriation) rights so long as the date of the creation of the reservation was
earlier than that of the date of first appropriation of a competing use under
state law. Stated in another way, tribes could claim water that had been
diverted previously by non-Indian water users under state law. Since state law
did not govern, Indian rights could not be lost by mere nonuse. The effect of
Winters is that a dual system of water rights emerge, one for Indian
reservations and one for private uses on lands governed by state law.24
The Winters precedent means that, as a practical matter, most disputes over
Indian water rights are destined to be resolved in the courts. Although
Congress can settle these questions by legislation, and the states and tribes
together with Congress can settle them by negotiation and compact, the
principal forum has been the courts. The essential thinking behind Winters
rights was stated by the Court in Arizona v. California:
Much of the land in these reservations is and always has been
arid. If the water necessary to sustain life is to be had, it must
come from the Colorado River or its tributaries. It can be said
without overstatement that when the Indians were put on these
reservations they were not considered to be located in the most
desirable part of the Nation. It is impossible to believe that when
Congress created the great Colorado River Indian Reservation...
[it was] unaware that most of the lands were of the desert kind hot, scorching sands - and that water from the river would be
essential to the life of the Indian people and to the animals they
hunted and the crops they raised.'
In summary, Arizona v. Californiaestablishes several key points. First, it
designates that reserved water is intended to satisfy the future as well as the
present needs of the reservation. Second, the decision requires the quantity
of reserved water to be measured by the amount of lands within the
reservation susceptible of irrigation. The Court grounded these concepts upon
a finding that the purpose of Congress in setting aside the Colorado River
Reservation was to support agriculture. Thus, according to the Court, lands
which are suitable for irrigation can be ascertained and an amount per acre
determined. The Court rejected a "per person" standard since the population
might grow. Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Indian water rights
were carved out of the then existing non-Indian claims under state law. The
Colorado River was over-appropriated, which means that at the time of the

24. See Michael C. Blumm, Reserved Water Rights, in 4 WATERs AND WATER RIGHTs,
supra note 20, at 199, 200-01.
25. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

litigation there were more water claims filed than there was water in the river.
Therefore, when the Court recognized the existence of a prior right in the
reservation, that water was taken necessarily from existing water uses.'
Since then the Supreme Court, in United States v. New Mexico,27 has
emphasized that reserved water is available only to the extent it is needed to
accomplish the original purpose of the reservation. No additional water is
reserved if the government later expands the purposes for which the
withdrawn land is to be administered. Finally, the Court now applies the
reasoning of Winters to federal lands as well as Indian lands. National Forests
provide the prime example, as do national monuments and military lands.
For purposes of the analysis in this paper, the Law of the River cases,
together with other Indian and federal reserved rights cases, in the post-World
War II era, involve the arid regions of the West, where irrigation is the larger
user and prior appropriation the governing state rule. The legal precedent that
has evolved is based on several key factors: (1) over-appropriation of an
interstate stream; (2) states governed by the water law principle of prior
appropriation; (3) underdeveloped Indian uses; (4) dominance of irrigation;
and (5) the general understanding that "use" is synonymous in various ways
with "diversion from the stream." New questions of both process and
substance arise when consideration is given to the question of how to apply
these legal principles to streams which present a different set of governing
facts. For example, no case has involved the application of Indian reserved
rights in a riparian jurisdiction. The variations are particularly marked in the
case of the Missouri River, to which attention is now directed.
IL The Missouri River
The Missouri River basin includes both arid and water-abundant regions,
and a world of striking contrasts. This world is, first of all, diverse,
encompassing ten states, several Canadian provinces, the lands of twenty-five
Indian tribes, and nearly the full range of known human land uses. It includes
major metropolitan areas as well as vast unpopulated expanses, and every type
of land tenure arrangement known in the United States. The Missouri River
runs some 2316 miles. Its basin takes in over 500,000 square miles, one-sixth
of the nation's area.
Water concerns of the upper basin are those associated with shortage
storage, irrigation, careful allocation. The water concerns of the lower basin
reflect water excess - flood control, navigation, and land drainage. This
difference is reflected in the prevailing state water laws. Upper basin states
rely upon some form of the principles of prior appropriation - a system that
assumes periodic shortage and insists upon careful management - whereas

26. Blumm, supra note 24.
27. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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the water law of the lower basin states is rooted in riparian systems, which are
more typically associated with water abundance. When the upper basin states
speak of water development, they refer to irrigation, water retention and
conservation; the lower basin states refer to levees, flood control dams and
navigation channels.
In the upper basin the federal government is a major landowner. This
ownership takes the form of Bureau of Land Management grazing land,
National Forests, National Grasslands, National Parks and National Wildlife
Refuges. Together, this ownership gives the federal government a claim to a
share of the upper basin water rights. Add to this the fact that the United
States, with the various Indian tribes of the upper basin, lay claim to a
substantial Winters doctrine Indian water right, and it is clear that the United
States and the tribes together may have a large share of the overall claim to
water rights in the upper basin. Few such proprietary-style federal claims
exist in the lower basin.
The continuing story of the Missouri Basin is the story of river
development.' To understand the history of this river's development, one
must recognize that it is the result of the constant playing-out of the tensions
and conflicts inherent in the basin. Today's river is intensively developed. In
the upper basin there are six massive main stem reservoirs which convert the
river north from Yankton, South Dakota into one large flat-water lake. South
from there the river is channeled in order to support navigation and guide the
river to its mouth near St. Louis. Flows from the Missouri are, in turn, an
essential component of Mississippi River navigation.
Development of the river has been at federal expense and occurred only
after a tough political struggle which was defined by the contrast and conflicts
among basin interests. The legal status of the river today is, in turn, defined
by change combined with the numerous ambiguities, compromises,
miscalculations, and misperceptions buried in federal development legislation
and administrative interpretation. The physical, social and economic facts in
the basin are changing. The players - tribes, states, public interest

28. The story is found in numerous sources: PETER CARRELS, UPHILL AGAINST WATER: THE
GREAT DAKOTA WATER WAR (1999); JOHN R. FERRELL, MISSOURI RIVER Div., U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, BIG DAM ERA: A LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM (1993) [hereinafter FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA]; JOHN R.
FERRELL, MISSOURI RIVER Div., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, SOUNDINGS: 100 YEARS OF
THE MISSOURI RIVER NAVIGATION PRoJEcr (1997); HENRY C. HART, THE DARK MISSOURI
(1957); MICHAEL L. LAWSON, DAMMED INDIANS: THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN AND THE MISSOURI
RIVER SIOUX, 1944-1980 (1982); MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, THE MISSOURI BASIN'S PICK-SLOAN
PLAN: A CASE STUDY IN CONGRESSIONAL POLICY DETERMINATION (1955); JOHN E. THORSON,
RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE POLITICS OF MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER (1994);
STANLEY VESTAL, THE MISSOURI (1941); NORTHERN LIGHTS INST., BOUNDARIES CARVED IN
WATER (1989-90); John H. Davidson, Missouri River Basin, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 20, at 151; John P. Guhin, The Law of the Missouri, 30 S.D. L. REV. 347 (1985).
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are changing. Federal water policy is changing. The needs

and demands of people in surrounding water basins are changing. Technology

allows us now to contemplate tasks that were not considered during the earlier
development period. Nonetheless, the old legal and political compromise

remains in place. Thus, unlike a basin such as the Colorado, where great
political, legal and economic struggles have been the story, the Missouri

seems only now to be entering its most active era of political and legal
contention.
III. The Missouri: Indian Reserved Water Rights, and the Law of the River
During the last several decades parties to most Missouri River
controversies have taken their guidance from the Law of the River. Despite
the maturity of this precedent, however, the model does not transfer readily

to the Missouri.
The extensive legislative history of the Missouri River development
program makes little mention, if any, of the numerous Indian tribes located
along the Missouri. The truth appears to be that although Missouri River
development had a direct negative effect on many tribes, their interests did not
receive serious consideration at any point in the legislative process. Even in
the lengthy and detailed debate over upper basin state water rights, a debate
which led to the enactment of specific protection for such rights," scarce

29. Perhaps the principal controversy to arise during the legislative debate was whether the
upstream consumptive water uses would have priority over the downstream use of water for
npvigation. The upstream states sought assurance that they could consume the water rather than
let it flow clown below Sioux City for navigation. The issue was clearly before Congress because
of the parallel introduction and consideration of a second bill, which became the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1945 and authorized constroction of a nine-foot channel below Sioux City, Iowa,
for purposes of enhancing navigation. A nine-foot channel to sustain navigation requires a great
deal of water. Unlike shipping on other rivers where ships are moved through a stable system
of locks, Missouri River shipping moves on open water, relying on releases of water from
upstream dams. To protect the upstream interests, the Act contains the following provision:
The use for navigation, in connection with the operation and maintenance of such
works herein authorized for construction, of waters arising in States lying wholly
or partly west of the ninety-eighth meridian shall be only such use as does not
conflict with any benpficial consumptive use, present or future, in States lying
wholly or partly west of the ninety-eighth meridian, of such waters for domestic,
municipal, stock-water, irrigation, mining, or industrial purposes.
Flood Conirol Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887, 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (1994). Senator O'Mahoney
summarized the meaning of this provision in the following language:
I may say for the benefit of all those who have cooperated in the preparation of
the amzndment ....

that the purpose has at all times been to protect the historic

and traditional rights of the people of the West to use the waters rising in the West
in the manner which has been recognized by law and by court decision for almost
100 years.
90 CONG. REC. 8420 (1944). This amendment, bolstered as it is by considerable legislative
history, thus states that when there is a conflict between irrigation or other historic upstream
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mention was made of tribal water rights. This may be explained by the
Congressional policy of assimilation of Indians which prevailed at the time.
Nonetheless, Indian tribes own substantial amounts of land in the upper basin,
and the majority of it is associated with the Missouri and its principal
tributaries. Thus, they may be presumed to be legitimate claimants to reserved
rights.
Because most Indian reserved rights in the upper basin are as yet
unexercised, upper basin states typically view the resulting uncertainty as
discouraging to economic development, and therefore hope to "quantify"
Indian water rights - to reduce the rights to a specific quantity that can be
drawn into account when state water appropriations are managed. Tribes tend
to be wary of such efforts by states, often interpreting them as attempts to
minimize Indian rights and to take advantage of the undeveloped condition of
Indian water. At the least tribes consider quantification to be premature.
Pursuing the model provided by the Law of the River the State of South
Dakota sought to quantify Indian water rights within the state by way of a
general basin-wide adjudication. By legislation the United States waives
sovereign immunity and consents to federal joinder in state court adjudications
if all water rights on a stream are being adjudicated simultaneously. 0 In
other words, Congress did not consent to state court adjudication of only
Indian or other federal water rights. However, if a state initiates a bona fide
adjudication of all rights in a watershed, the United States will consent to
state court jurisdiction in order to facilitate the process?'
The problem for South Dakota was that if it wanted to quantify Indian
reserved rights in state court, the relevant watershed was the entire Missouri
River drainage within the state. Thus it is that the suit known as "Rippling
Water" was filed in 1980, seeking to determine all rights in the state to the
Missouri River system, which includes at least ten tributary rivers. The suit
involved nearly two-thirds of South Dakota geography, and approximately
60,000 landowners were named as defendants. The litigation focused, as it
was intended, on the defendant tribes'
Rippling Water (as the litigation is informally captioned) proved to be too
grand an undertaking for the state's budget, and was dismissed on the motion
of the State, without prejudice.33 The case indicates, however, the extent to
consumptive uses, and downstream navigation, the upstream interests shall be entitled to a
preference. Did Congress really intend this? The answer must be "yes" followed by a quick
qualifier. The more accurate answer is that Congress hoped that, by authorizing and constructing
a system with immense storage capacity, both uses could be satisfied and a decision on priorities
deferred. In today's world, this requires that the river be managed in order to avoid the direct
conflict to which the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment seems to provide but one answer.
30. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
31. United States v. District Court in and for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).

32. The United States and the tribes removed the case to federal district court and the state
motion to remand was granted.
33. In re General Adjudication of all Rights to Use Water and Water Rights on the Missouri

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

which states will consider going in order to avoid having federal reserved
rights quantified in federal rather than state courts. It also indicates the great
difficulty faced by an upper basin state that seeks to adjudicate water rights
in the main course of the river. It is one thing to litigate rights in a relatively
small and discrete headwater, such as the Big Horn River in Wyoming, but
quite another to adjudicate the rights of the Sioux, whose lands are adjacent
to the main water body.
Montana has also sought to apply the Law of the River to the Missouri.
In 1979 it created a Montana Reserved Water Rights Commission solely for
the purpose of negotiating and settling Indian water claims.' As with the
Rippling Water adjudication, however, the focus is on quantification.
The original development plan for the water stored behind the five great
dams on the main stem of the Missouri called for diversion from the stream
to irrigate between four and five million acres of private land, mostly in the
Eastern Dakotas. Reality has set in, and it is now generally accepted that the
proposed irrigation is not feasible.3s Thus, from the perspective of the upperbasin states, the promised payoff from Missouri River development is
unfilfilled, and they continue to search for an alternative bonanza. The failure
of irrigation in the upper basin presents the question of what, if any thing, to
do with the water behind the dams which was originally, intended for
irrigation. Here again, policymakers reverted, albeit indirectly, to the Law of
the River for guidance.
The question first came up as a part of the response to the energy shortage
associated with foreign oil embargoes during the 1970s. Because the upper
basin states contain significant reserves of coal and other fossil fuels,
numerous plans and schemes for energy development were initiated. Energy
development always requires large quantities of water, and planners turned to
the main stem reservoirs. In 1974, it was estimated that around three million
acre-feet were available annually from supplies stored but not used for
irrigation.' The upper basin states wanted to capture the value of these
surplus waters. The lower basin states were more than suspicious of any plans
to remove water from the reservoirs. The Corps and the Bureau of
Reclamation - competing federal agencies - each were reluctant to yield
control. IThe ultimate legal question, still unresolved, is whether the states
have rights to any of the water in the reservoirs, and, if so, how they may
exercise control.
The Corps and the Bureau of Reclamation sought an interim solution in a
Memorandum of Understanding which, for a two-year period, established that

River System, State of South Dakota, 294 N.W.2d 784 (S.D. 1980).
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-701 (1999). See generally PETER W. SLY, RESERVED WATER
RIGHTs SETI-LEMENT MANUAL (1988).
35. CARRELS, supra note 28.
36. FERRELL, BiG DAM ERA, supra note 28, at 148.
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joint marketing by the two agencies could be undertaken. The upper basin
states predictably objected, and a compromise was reached which allowed the
states to control pricing and selling of water that was intended originally for
federal irrigation projects.
The agreement and all of the issues it raised remained unanswered and
dormant until the autumn of 1981 when Energy Transportation Systems, Inc.
(ETSI) announced its intent to contract with South Dakota to purchase 50,000
acre-feet of water per year for fifty years from the Oahe Reservoir, which is
located on the Missouri River and within the state. ETSI intended to transport
the water by pipeline westward to Wyoming where it would be used to slurry
coal for transit to Arkansas. ETSI also obtained a water service contract from
the Bureau of Reclamation and a pumping permit from the Corps. The
contract price for the fifty years was $1.4 billion, which South Dakota hoped
to use to finance local water projects. Nonetheless, the ETSI case raised many
of the hot issues. The contract was between a state and a private company for
out-of-state use. Indian tribes perceived a conflict with their reserved water
rights. The lower basin states were concerned with what they saw as a
precedent for out-of-basin diversions to the detriment of navigation. The
question was clearly raised whether an upper basin state, or any basin state
for that matter, had independent rights in some of the stored reservoir water.
This water right was issued, after all, by a state rather than federal agency.37
In 1982, the Bureau of Reclamation gave ETSI permission via a contract
allowing ETSI to withdraw up too 20,000 acre-feet of water per year from
Lake Oahe for forty years.
The downstream states objected to the withdrawal of this water from the
Missouri River and claimed some entitlements to its continued presence in the
river. They brought suit in 1982 shortly after federal permission was granted.
The District Court ruled for the plaintiffs." The Court of Appeals
affirmed.39 In ETSI Pipeline Projectv. Missouri, the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed, holding clearly that the reservoirs are under the
control of the Corps and that any permit to market surplus water must be
approved by the Corps rather than the Bureau of Reclamation:
In light of these specific provisions as well as the general
background to the Act, it is beyond question that the Interior
Secretary does not possess the authority that is claimed in this
case: to execute a contract to provide water from an Army

37. The state water right is described at In re Water Permit No. 179102, 351 N.W.2d 119
(S.D. 1984).
38. Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Mo. 1984), affd, 787 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. granted, 480 U.S. 905 (1987), affd, 484 U.S. 495 (1988).
39. Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted,480 U.S. 905 (1987),
affd, 484 U.S. 495 (1988).
40. 484 U.S. 495 (1988).
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reservoir for industrial uses without obtaining the approval of the
Secretary of the Army. Nobody has disputed that Lake Oahe, one
of the six main-stem reservoirs on the Missouri River, was
constructed by, and has been operated and maintained by, the
Army Secretary, and the District Court found this to be true as a
matter of fact. The Act says explicitly that such reservoirs are
"under the control of' or "under the direction of' the Army
Secretary. Only two provisions of the Act provide for the Interior
Secretary to exercise any authority whatsoever at Army reservoirs,
and in both instances the Act clearly states that the Interior
Secretary's authority is subordinate to that of the Army Secretary,
who does after all "control" those reservoirs. The Interior
Secretary is authorized to "transmit and dispose of' electric power
and energy generated at army reservoirs but only when that
energy is "in the opinion of the Secretary of [the Army] not
required in the operation of such projects." The Interior Secretary
is also authorized to recommend to the Army Secretary that an
Army reservoir "be utilized for irrigation purposes," and to
"construct, operate, and maintain . . . such additional works in
connection therewith as he may deem necessary for irrigation
purposes." But this authority only comes into play if the Army
Secretary "determines" that "any dam or reservoir project operated
under [the Secretary's] direction" may be used for such purposes.
The language of the Act is plain in every respect, and the
conclusion is unavoidable that if the Interior Secretary wishes to
remove water from an Army reservoir for any purpose, the
approval of the Army Secretary must be secured.
The precise authority claimed by the Interior Secretary in this
case is to enter into a contract, without the approval of the Army,
to remove from Lake Oahe water that is claimed to be available
for irrigation, and to allow that water to be devoted to industrial
use. Nowhere does the Act provide any support for this claimed
authority, and in fact it is directly inconsistent with §§ 6 and 8 of
the Act, which show that only the Army Secretary has that
independent authority in this instance.4 '
The ETSI project never materialized and the company's water delivery
contract with South Dakota was rescinded according to its terms. 2
The ElTSI case retains a singular importance because of the light it casts on
the division between the upper and lower basin. On the surface the issue did
not seem so important. It was whether Congress intended Oahe Reservoir

41. Id. at 505 (citations omitted).
42. Guhin, supra note 28, at 383.
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(located in the upper basin) to be a "reclamation" facility subject to the water
marketing authority of the Secretary of the Interior. The reason that upper
basin states fought strenuously for Interior (Bureau of Reclamation)
jurisdiction is found in section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, which
provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to
affect or in any way interfere with the laws of any State or
Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use or distribution
of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired
thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the
provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such
laws.43
Section 8 requires that all actions of the Bureau of Reclamation conform to
state water law in the delivery of main stem water, a constraint that is
perceived as basic by the upper basin states, which fear that local control may
be subordinated to the Corps' traditional preference for managing rivers for
flood control and navigation. Thus, the decision was viewed as a serious
setback in the upper basin.
The State of South Dakota was so concerned over the potential effect of
the Supreme Court opinion in ETS! Pipeline Projectv. Missouri on its ability
to allocate the water of the river within the state that it filed an original action
for equitable apportionment against the downstream states with the Supreme
Court of the United States." The Supreme Court delayed action on the
lawsuit until it considered and decided the ETSI case.
In South Dakota v. Nebraska, Iowa & Missouri,45 South Dakota argued
that Congress accomplished a partial apportionment of the waters in the
Missouri River when it enacted the Flood Control Act of 1944. According to
South Dakota, the Act identifies a significant amount of water to be stored in
the main stem reservoirs in South Dakota for various reclamation purposes,
but principally irrigation. Those projects may eventually consume a very.
substantial amount of water, and South Dakota asserts that until the irrigation
projects are built, it has the authority to administer these waters free from the
interference of the three downstream states. In other words, the plaintiff
state's argument is that if the Bureau of Reclamation irrigation projects had
been built, they would be operating under the federal reclamation laws, which
require that the Bureau acquire and operate with state water rights, pursuant
to state water law. In that event the three lower basin states would be
powerless to object to the diversions under state law. Now, although the same

43. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1994).
44. South Dakota v. Nebraska, 485 U.S. 902 (1998) (memoranda decision); South Dakota
v. Nebraska, 475 U.S. 1093 (1986) (same).

45. Id.
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water is surplus pending future irrigation development, the state should be free
to control its use without interference from the three named defendant
states.
Thus, South Dakota's case was not a petition to the Supreme Court for an
equitable apportionment of the river. It was directed only to the specific
controversy with the defendant states who had objected to the ETSI diversion.
South Dakota's petition was ultimately denied, and the underlying issues
simmer.4 The plaintiffs case was a clear attempt to transfer to the Missouri
the holding in Arizona v. California,and in that it failed.
ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, along with the related attempts at
litigation, represent but one stage in a controversy that began with the
O'Mahoney-Milliken debate.' The debate - focused on whether upper basin
states will control the river's supplies - will surface and resurface. A more
recent skirmish found the upper basin states in a position they had always
sought to avoid: dealing directly with the Corps of Engineers in a debate over
how the river should be managed.
In the late 1980s drought placed more stress on the main stem reservoirs
since any time after they had been filled.49 This drought "compounded the
enmity between upstream and downstream interests, [and] amplified the
imbalance between realized and unrealized lower and upper basin Pick-Sloan
program benefits.' Again, focus was upon issues that had not been dealt
with seriously in the Flood Control Act of 1944. This time the interest was
the use of the upper basin reservoirs for recreation, an industry that has grown
lucrative, particularly at Oahe Dam in South Dakota and Garrison Dam in
North Dakota. When drought came, the upper basin states concluded that the
Corps was drawing-down the reservoirs in order to carry downstream
navigation through the barge traffic seasons. In other words, the Corps was
favoring a downstream, lower-basin, interest in its management of the river.
Again, the upper basin states went to court.
South Dakota v. Hazens" was brought by the upper basin states seeking
to enjoin the Corps from dropping the water level in Lake Oahe below that
necessary to assure a successful walleye fish spawn by reducing releases for
downstream navigation and not by lowering the levels in reservoirs. The
Corps claimed it could not reduce releases under the rules in the Master
Manual, the document it follows in operating the main stem reservoirs. The
district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Corps from
46. Guhin, supra note 28, at 478.
47. South Dakota v. Nebraska, 474 U.S. 941 (1985) (memoranda decision); South Dakota
v. Nebraska, 475 U.S. 1093 (1986) (same); South Dakota v. Nebraska, 485 U.S. 902 (1988)

(same).
48.
49.
50.
51.

See supra note 29.
FaRRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 28, at 156.
Id.
914 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1990).
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lowering the level of Lake Oahe until June 1, 1990, by which time the
walleye spawn would have been complete. The district court rejected the
Corps' contention that its actions were unreviewable.
On expedited appeal, the Eighth Circuit issued an order in which it stated
that it had serious doubts whether the Corps' decisions regarding river
management were reviewable. The Court also said that even if the Corps'
decisions were reviewable, a preliminary injunction should not have been
granted because the record did not support the district court's conclusion that
the decisions of the Corps were arbitrary and capricious. In a subsequently
rendered formal opinion, the Circuit Court declined to decide the reviewability
issue, holding that the case was moot because the walleye spawn was
complete.
A second suit by the upper basin states was brought as the drought
persisted and reservoir levels continued to decline. This time the plaintiff
states contended that the Flood Control Act of 1944 established only two
priorities: flood control and upstream beneficial consumptive uses. They
argued that all other priorities have been established administratively by the
Corps, that the Flood Control Act provides flexibility and requires the Corps
to regularly balance the use of water storage and develop a plan of operation
that reflects contemporary uses and needs of the basin. The plaintiffs further
argued that if the Corps treated fish, wildlife, and recreational uses
appropriately, more water would be left in the upstream reservoirs because the
priorities for the water would be based on a realistic assessment of the
benefits of lower basin navigation in relation to the benefits of upper basin
recreational uses. The plaintiffs based their argument on assertions that the
navigation industry that was envisioned in 1944 has never materialized and
that navigation on the lower Missouri has declined in recent years. Upstream
benefits from fish, wildlife, and recreation, on the other hand, were estimated
at that time as $67 million annually, "while the annual benefit of downstream
navigation is estimated at less that $14 million."' This suit did not go to
trial. A settlement based upon the willingness of the Corps to draft a new
Master Manual was reached. (Additionally, in 1992 and 1993, it rained.)
This most recent controversy raises the fundamental issue of identifying the
purposes that the Corps is obligated to take into consideration when managing
the river. Does the Flood Control Act direct the Corps to manage for "other
purposes"? If so, what are they? Does the Corps have the authority to alter
the purposes for which it manages the reservoirs? The Pick-Sloan documents
refer almost exclusively to the purposes of flood control, navigation,
irrigation, and hydroelectric power. The phrases "and other uses" or "and

52. Id.; see Brian Morris, UnansweredPrayers: The UpperMissouriRiver Basin States Take
on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 68 N.D. L. REV. 897 (1992).
53. Missouri River Regulation by the Corps of Engineers, WATER L. NEWSL. (Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Found.), vol. 24, no. 1, 1991, at 1, 3.
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other purposes" do appear in some places. On this basis the Corps has
determined that it has authority to operate Corps projects to benefit recreation
consistent with and subordinate to other purposes, including navigation.m
We thus observe that despite enormous and costly efforts to force the
template of the Law of the River, the Missouri remains unallocated. The Law
of the River - the set of rules which emerge from the arid regions - does
not appear to solve conflicts among states, tribes, and the United States over
how this river is to be used.
IV. The Flow is the Resource
The Missouri offers us what Professor Tarlock describes as the "paradox
of conflict without scarcity" - the paradox of a "conflict over absolute
abundance rather than scarcity."55 In this the Missouri presents a situation
that is distinguishable from that of those rivers where conflict led to or was
governed by the Law of the River. With the Missouri, the Law of the River
doesn't work. It has been tried, as we have seen, and with no significant
reduction in conflict. The Law of the River assumes physical scarcity and
assumes also that a majority of the desired water uses are consumptive,
requiring some sort of diversion or removal of the water from the
watercourse. It assumes that the river is simply a commodity to be used to the
maximum extent possible.
Professor Tarlock proposes, and I think rightly, that the model that will
work for the Missouri should be based upon a recognition that the primary
use of the river will always be nonconsumptive, and that what must be shared
is a managed flow resource.' But, what legal principles are to govern the
allocation of a river where the value is not in consumptive diversions but in
control over management of the flow? Generally the flow of a river is not
something in which a property right can be asserted, except where a state
prior appropriation water right has been established first, followed by state
validation of an instream flow.
Property in a river's flow has not been protected under the federal nocompensation rule. While no perfect definition of the rule exists, in 1941 the
Supreme Court stated:
The dominant power of the federal Government, as has been
repeatedly held, extends to the entire bed of a stream, which
includes the lands below ordinary high-water mark. The exercise
of the power within these limits is not an invasion of any private

54. FaRRELL, BIG DAM ERA, supra note 28, at 157.
55. A. Dan Tarlock, The Missouri River: The Paradox ofConflict Without Scarcity, 2 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 1-2 (1997).
56. Id. at 11-12.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol24/iss1/13

No. 1]

INDIAN WATER RIGHTS

property right in such lands for which the United States must
make compensation."
There is, therefore, no constitutional right to compensation when the federal
government interferes with a use of the flow of a navigable stream or its
tributary." In addition, where property rights exist, either in riparian land or
water rights the navigation servitude recognizes that the regulatory power of
Congress - agencies such as the Corps acting pursuant to Congressional
authorization - is quite broad." As a result the one thing of value in the
Missouri River - the flow - appears to be closely controlled by the Corps
of Engineers despite the serious claims of tribes and states.
V. A Searchfor Process: The Master Manual Review
The Law of the River enjoys the signal advantage of defined processes for
conflict resolution: stream-wide adjudications, compacts, judicial precedent
and Supreme Court review provide what is for the most part a predictable
framework in which rules such as that of Winters can be applied. In sharp
contrast, with the Missouri we are faced with what is at best an elusive
administrative process and at its worst an absence of process:
The standard institutional accounts of the Missouri River focus
appropriately on the federal-state conflicts and the failure of the
states to find a mutually acceptable allocation formula or even to
find a successful cooperation process. The states have preferred
bitter, but tried and true, traditional sectional water politics to
cooperation. The federal government has managed the river,
primarily with the support of the lower basin states, but has
provided little vision or leadership . . . . Due to the Great
Depression, the basin states were given a series of multiple
purpose mainstem reservoirs that were to be managed by the
federal government for the benefit of basin water users and states.
By default, the Corps became the rivermaster to the exclusion of
the states and the Bureau of Reclamation.'
The ETSI decision held that the reservoirs and their management are under
the control of the Corps' Litigation to achieve something approaching
apportionment cannot be successfully initiated, and the upper basin states were
willing to settle litigation in which they asserted the dominance of upper basin
uses. The only process remaining is a review by the Corps of Engineers of

57. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co, 312 U.S. 592, 596-97 (1941).
58. Morreale, supra note 9, at 43-46.

59. Id.
60. Tarlock, supranote 55, at 3 (emphasis added).
61. ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 514 (1988).
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what it refers to as the Missouri River Master Water Control Manual (the
Master Manual). The Master Manual is "the document that presents the basic
water control plan and objectives for the integrated operation of the mainstem
reservoirs in conjunction with the downstream projects."' This review
process provides the "only game in town." Presumably, all legitimate
claimants to Missouri River water and water uses must find satisfaction from
this process, or be precluded from relief for the foreseeable future. For tribes,
seeking to protect and assert Winters rights, the new process presents a unique
situation.
The process of developing a revised Master Manual is far from simple, and
its consequences are both direct and immediately apparent on that ground.
Once in place, the revised Master Manual governs every aspect of the river's
flow, and influences every use. Those whose day-to-day economies rely on
the river - such as hydropower users, recreation concessionaires, barge users,
domestic and agricultural water suppliers, downstream riparian cities, and
industries - are affected directly. Flow patterns have an equally direct
impact on the natural river ecosystems, including those based in the riparian
zone. All who live along the river or use it in any way are affected by the
scope and content of the Master Manual. More importantly, because of both
the administrative and practical complexity, once implemented, the Master
Manual is not readily changed. While not a "permanent" solution, the Master
Manual, as a practical matter, is a final rule that is likely to govern for an
extended period. As a result, all whose interest are affected, such as the
Missouri River Indian tribes, must treat this process with appropriate respect.
Some will likely conclude that it is excessive to suggest that the Master
Manual administrative process is analogous to a judicial process leading to a
final appellate court decision and order. The final Master Manual will, after
all, be subject to judicial review. If particularly controversial, some sort of
Congressional oversight is theoretically available. Having said that, it is
indeed the suggestion here that the final Master Manual may lock in the status
of specific river uses with a firmness that is every bit as solid as many
Supreme Court equitable apportionments. Any given process is as important
as the finality and enforceability of the final decision, be it judicial, legislative
or administrative. For Missouri River water users, the Master Manual process
may be as important as the litigation in Arizona v. Californiawas to Colorado
River water users. In other words, for the Missouri, it is the law of the river.
The Master Manual review process, once concluded, will have extended
across more than a decade, and will have consumed an enormous amount of
public resources. A first proposal accompanied by a Draft Environmental
Impact Statement was published in July 1994, followed by a period of public
review and comment. A revised draft proposal and environmental impact

62. MISSOURI RIVER Div., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT, MISSOURI RIVER MASTER WATER CONTROL MANUAL 1-1(July 1994).
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statement appeared in the autumn of 1998, with a comment period to extend
through March 2000. The schedule then calls for a final plan and
environmental impact statement in 2000, followed by a formal Record of
Decision, revision of the Master Manual, and implementation on the ground.
VI. The Claims of the Missouri River Tribes
At its essence, for tribes along the Missouri, a Winters doctrine claim is
that they are entitled to the economic benefits of water, that is, to the use of
water needed to construct some type of economy and society. In the familiar
terms of the Law of the River this claim would be redeemed by adjudication
of a specific quantity of available annual flows as owned by the tribes. These
ownership rights are thereafter binding and enforceable against other
claimants. In the context of the Missouri, where the resource is the abundant
flow in the main channel, the Winters right claim is less likely to be realized
in terms of a specific quantity. Rather, tribes are compelled to argue that
since it is the abundant flow that is generating economic benefits, tribes must,
like any other property owner, be allowed to determine how the flow is to be
used, and to enjoy directly the economic benefits generated by that use.
By way of further explanation, consider the situation of a tribe with
adjudicated Winters rights to Colorado River water. Because such a tribe is
owner of a specific amount of water, it is free to generate economic return by
diverting the water for its own use or by leasing the water to others. In the
Colorado basin, these are the principal means of developing economic return.
In contrast, on the Missouri the tribes have an acknowledged but
unadjudicated Winters right to the waters. However, it is the flow that is of
economic value, just as it is the diversion that is of economic value on the
Colorado. As owners, are the tribes not then entitled to claim the economic
value of that property as it is used? Are they not entitled to a share of control
over the flow? If so, by what process are they to raise the claim?
Employing simple property analysis, and assuming that a portion of the
waters in the flow belong to the tribes, there is cause of action for a trespass
or conversion unless the property right has been in some way qualified (as by
congressional action), is subsequent to other rights, or the tribe is somehow
barred from seeking judicial protection of its property interest.
Apart from direct legislative intervention, which is unlikely, it appears that
Missouri River tribes have available only two procedural avenues in their
search for a meaningful application of their Winters doctrine water rights. The
first, as we have seen, is the Law of the River model, which assumes scarcity
as well as a current desire and ability to divert and put to use a specific
amount of river water. Since there is not scarcity along the Missouri, and
since any diversion by the tribes in the foreseeable future is at best
speculative, this approach has little value. Second, a compact among tribes,
basin states and the United States would recognize Winters rights. Due to the
sharp division of interest among the upper and lower basin states and among
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the upper basin states and the tribes, a compact is also remote. The third
avenue takes the tribes into uncharted legal and policy grounds. In the
absence of scarcity and proposed diversions, tribes can claim, in theory,
control over the flow of the river in proportion to their ownership interest.
However, control of the flow is in the hands of the Corps and its Master
Manual process - a de facto allocation. Do the tribes, owners of Winters
water rights in the Missouri River, have a legal right to specify the results of
the Master Manual review? If not, what do the tribes own? To what extent
is the Corps bound to honor tribal interests and goals? Do the tribes have
procedures for relief if tribal interests are not honored?
The Flood Control Act of 1944 is the authority for the Corps' operations
and it specifies that the Corps is to control the flow for a variety of purposes,
all of which ignore the Winters claim of the Missouri River tribes. In addition
the Corps is armed with extraordinary constitutional authority over the flow
in the form of the no-compensation rule and the navigation servitude. It is fair
to assume that such regulatory authority extends to Winters rights as readily
as to property rights created by state law. In other words, the Corps comes
to the review process armed with hefty constitutional authority to administer
and regulate private interests, including water rights asserted by tribes and
states.
For tribes, comfortable with the existing form and substance of Winters
rights, claims and adjudications, the Master Manual review process presents
the need for a new script. If the value of Missouri River water is in the flow,
then the interest of the tribes become more analogous to that of riparian
landowners, who seek and enjoy their water benefits on the basis of
geographic location. However, the power to allocate benefits among riparians
is lodged almost exclusively with the Corps, which comes to the process
armed with a broad constitutional and legislative mandate. Thus, how the
Corps chooses to manage the Missouri River is likely to bear on the tribes
with the heavy weight of finality.
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